

Video Script for Icebreaker Unchained : We should have lost World War II

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Summary

I MUST POSE PROVOCATIVE QUESTIONS!

Targets :

- 30 minute introduction to the theme, well set up for further episodes.

Status as of ?date?:

-

endpage

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Introduction__Core_theme_of_Hitler_as_a_Stalin_protege

The core theme of this film is the supposition that Russian Communists had early on [identified, selected] Hitler as a very interesting candidate among many for indirect, and indirect [support, protection, networking with powerful contacts, political promotion].

Russian Communists were not only active in organising and supporting German Communists, they were also actively engaged in doing the same for other revolutionaries. From before they consolidated power, the primary and oft-stated objective of Russian Communists was to take over the world, and in a loose sense they do not differ from early Christianity, Islam, and modern Western ideologies of democracy and freedom. This is quite different from Judaism and perhaps most Eastern philosophies. This objective has never been abandoned in principle, albeit most modern Russian Communists may look at it as being idealistic and anachronistic. Towards the end of this film, we'll see just how close they actually came to realizing this goal. But our immediate question is whether, at this very early stage, Russians "invisible hand" was already deftly at work. The central theme of this film is that Russians certainly played a very active and important role in Hitler's rise to power, and the "false appearance" that the Nazis nearly succeeded with a non-intended world conquest soon thereafter.

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PART I

...

Opening Context : Soon after the Battle of Britain

A_year_of_stunning_victories

Following the invasion of Poland on September 1st 1939, during the first year of the Second World War Nazi Germany's superb [leadership, innovations, planning, preparations, and war machine] mercilessly pounded out one stunning victory after another. British moral was close to rock bottom, and their army had lost most of its equipment at Dunkirk, only escaping with their soldiers thanks to Hitlers' strange orders to pull back his tanks at the critical moment.

Why did Hitler let the British army escape? Pay attention to the following analysis, because the same question comes up later when Hitler again decides not to conquer the British, and even offers to ally with them.

Three_hurdles_against_the_Nazis

There was a tangible fear that the conquest of Britain was close, that the Nazis could not be defeated. But by the end of the first year of war, the Nazi momentum was halted in three strategic areas.

Battle_of_Britain

The first, and perhaps most famous, strategic hurdle was the stalling of the invasion of Britain. The Luftwaffe had driven the British air force to the brink of collapse during the Battle of Britain. In spite of all odds, the Royal Air Force had prevailed.

As described in Wikipedia (1) on the 24th of August 1940, Luftwaffe night bombers aiming for RAF airfields drifted off course and accidentally destroyed several London homes, killing civilians. This resulted in a rapid escalation starting with UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill's bombing of Berlin on the next night, followed by regular German bombing of British cities until the following spring, and British bombing of German centers until the end of the war.

It is commonly claimed that Hitler's emotional focus on bombing London had diverted the Luftwaffe from finishing off the RAF. But the possibility of a successful invasion of Britain, called Operation Sea Lion, was still very real. Why didn't Hitler push the invasion at that time? Extremely high risks,

difficult logistics, and the prospect of facing a determined and effective people on their home soil must all have been factors. And as with Dunkirk, perhaps Hitler was again showing a strange affinity for the British, and an intense dislike of the idea of destroying them. But was there something more to it than this? Something dwarfing all other considerations? We shall return to that question shortly.

1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz

Battle_of_Atlantic

The second strategic hurdle of the Nazi advance was the beginning of more effective defenses against the U-boat submarine attacks against Allied shipping in the North Atlantic. While the Nazi surface fleet, lead by the Bismark and Tirpiz, had quickly been neutralized by the British navy, the Nazi submarines had throttled the American-British convoys, and were close to strangling the British war efforts.

Battle_of_Oil

The third strategic hurdle for the Nazis was to secure major oil supply alternatives. This was perhaps even more important than popularly recognized.

The Nazis had always know that one of their greatest vulnerabilities was oil, which they sourced mainly from their Russian allies, as well as from Romanian oilfields. The Romanian oil was well protected by distance from British air bases, but it was exposed to their Russian Axis partner. A fall-back source, modest but critical, was the production of oil from coal in Germany, a source that would soon be subject to bombing by British Lancaster and Halifax aircraft, and which in any case was hideously expensive. In the summer of 1940, Mussolini confidently assumed an easy victory in Egypt over British forces only one-sith the size of the Italians. This would have given the Axis control over the Suez canal, plus a path to Persian Gulf oilfields. But the British quickly counter-attacked and destroyed the Italian forces. Efforts over a year later by famed Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, known as the "Desert Fox", also failed to conquer Egypt, in spite of brilliant victories fed by fantastic espionage. The British navy and the Royal Air Force on Malta were vital to choking off Rommel's supplies of oil and other materials.

Oil certainly wasn't the only strategic resource, but it was a big one. If this was a critical strategic priority of the Nazis, then preventing their access to oil also had to be a top strategic priority for the Allies. But this was also important for somebody else, someone who was NOT an Ally.

Operation_Sea_Lion

Let us return to the three strategic hurdles facing the Nazis : the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Battle of Oil. A key potential solution for ALL three hurdles could have been the the immediate invasion and conquest of Britain, code named Operation Sea Lion. An undefeated Nazi army, and a still over-powering Nazi air force were poised at the English channel.

The Nazi plans were still viable and, in the opinion of not a few experts, would likely have succeeded.

But Hitler decided NOT to invade. Why? Why would he turn back from this challenge, however daunting, that was vital to his ultimate success? Why would a super-leader who had based his own political career AND his thousand-year Reich on huge but measured gambles, turn away from what CLEARLY had to be done? Did Hitler blunder, ultimately leading to Nazi defeat?

To be sure, commentary abounds for the motives and actions at this point in time. We can list several themes : Hitler persistently respected the British and was reluctant to invade. The Nazis felt that an invasion would be disastrous, not the least because of the nations recently proven resolve, and Winston Churchill's proven super-leadership and inspiration for his people. Or that Hitler was manifesting signs of madness that later overtook him and led to Nazi defeat. There are many other themes that we will not delve into here.

Failure_of_Western_intellectuals

But in this film we are NOT going to pursue the huge mainstream consensus thinking of Western [historians, military and political] analysts. We are going to pursue alternative concepts grounded in Russian Communist thinking, which was THE [inspiration, foundation, and parent] of Nazist thinking. Think of that statement for a minute. Western intellectuals and experts have for a long time wrongly classified Nazism as right-wing. But as we shall see later in this film, Nazism was always left-wing, and didn't even have to wear a disguise to permanently dupe Westerners into thinking Nazism was right-wing. This is only one of many examples of the failures of Western intellectual interpretations. In other words, in order to understand the **motivations of** leaders who drove the Second World War, we cannot solely rely on Western intellectuals, even if they certainly provide essential background data, concepts, models, and theories as a starting point, and as a very important source of anomalies that help us to get past the overwhelming mainstream consensus thinking and flaws therein.

Back_to_the_future

In order to understand Hitler's decision NOT to invade Britain, we must go back in time two decades before the war. We will re-interpret Nazism's origins, Hitler's career, and the origins and foundations of the Second World War. We will likely find our wanderings to be wrong, but one often learns the most from being wrong. And learning requires more than just following the herd, it requires questioning, gathering new information, and keeping one's eyes and ears open.

endsection

Communists_itching_for_a_war

Drowning_in_wealth_with_jealousy_and_rebellion

I have a saying that the primary driver of social change is afford-ability, even more than education. The industrial revolution brought about a gigantic step-change increase in wealth and all the possibilities that engendered. It would have been impossible to predict the adaptations required for the transition from agrarian to industrial societies, just as it would have been completely unreasonable to expect societies to be able to re-invent [political, legal, economic, and military] practices and institutions at a pace equal to the in-rushing tsunami of wealth.

Historical hindsight could have provided only a hint about the huge population explosion and urbanisation, as family attitudes stayed constant and a huge demand for labor opened up. Furthermore, the great natural, astronomically-based climate and agrarian cycles which had long dominated agriculture, also had a substantial correlation with, if not impact on, industrial economic activity. Our great recessions of today would have seemed like a cake walk to people of that time, meaning that despite a continued surge in standards of living, things could get rough for all of the people some of the time, some of the people all of the time, but not all of the people all of the time. It is a curious flaw of Western intellectuals that the extended period of industrialisation is typically seen only as the dark despair of Charles Dickens' tales, as opposed to the riches of possibilities and opportunities that it posed for more and more of the population.

But the heights of discontent are driven not by the worst of conditions, but by the best of conditions - including a taste of greater wealth and freedom, jealousy of those minorities of [class, nationality, or race] doing disproportionately well, resentment of those who used their power to wrest opportunity from one's own group, and a sense that the risk-reward potential of rebellion was looking very, very attractive.

Traditional aristocrats, together with industrialist who had brought the wealth, whether capitalists or not, were easy targets for sloppy and jealous thinking. All over the industrial world, cafes and smokehouses were inhabited by rich and upper middle class idles with modern educations, who could afford to choose to be poor. Inflamed rhetoric spread like wildfire. Meanwhile, [indignation, outrage, and conservatism] grew like wildfire among the privileged, and the resultant butting of heads led to thicker skulls and greater deafness among all. From the mid-nineteenth century these pressures had been building quickly.

Society had been changing, evolving and accommodating new concepts VERY quickly, but not quickly enough for some. Perhaps it was inevitable that this situation would lead to a societal discontinuity of sorts, and it is no surprise that World War I was a key break-over point. Unfortunately, this would have terrible consequences for over half of the world's population up to and beyond today, over a century later.

Destroy_and_rebuild_both_man_and_society

The century starting in the mid-1800's was a melting pot of political ideologies, but we will focus on socialism, which was born of jealousy, anarchy and nihilism. Socialists were no friends of the farmers, seeing them as conservative impediments to progress. Likewise, the industrial workers who formed the target audience for socialists, also required re-programming to the new socialist religion. This was really only possible for the young - the old dogs would have to be tolerated and programmed by terror

in the meantime to permit the remaking of the basis of society.

But this was not possible for everyone. Genocide has been a constant of 10,000 years of history, and my stole-and-adapted catch-phrase, "wars don't kill people, people kill people" suggests that it's not the actual war, but the before-during-after genocide that takes the greatest toll of human life and terror. Eugenics as a concept is distinct from genocide to the extent that post-Darwin knowledge of genes is any different than breeding that has always been practiced. And eugenics, whether class OR racially targeted, has ONLY been an official policy and practice of socialism. Today, eugenics is mostly linked to the Nazis, hence the importance of mis-classifying them as right-wing. Eugenics has somehow NOT been linked to it's origins : which were socialist prophets such as Karl Marx, nor practitioners such as the Soviets.

Socialists initially thought that the successful Russian revolution would immediately and inevitably spill over quickly into world revolution and dominance. Sadly for them, but lucky for us who escaped that mantle of good intentions, the revolution was stalled.

The road to hell IS paved with good intentions. From the unconventional point of view of this film, you cannot cannot understand WWII if you do not understand this context, that is, the socialist drive to world domination, coupled with the naive mix of good intentions, jealousy, and subconscious viciousness of the socialists, and every one else. That includes you and I.

Exporting_trouble

Germany had exported communist leader Vladimir Ilyanovich Lenin to Russia during the the first world war with the intent of fostering revolution and dissension as a means to reduce the Russian threat on their Eastern flank, and the pressure of a war on two fronts. The Communist injection tactic was successful beyond Germany's wildest dreams. Was this in part due to an untold, or seldom retold, story of massive support from Germany for the Communist revolutionaries not only during the 1917 Revolution but afterwards during the consolidation of Communist power? ????????????

Over the ensuing years, the Russian Communists learned the hard way the secrets to their own stunning success, lessons on how to win against much more powerful and advanced opponents. One of many strategies and tactics was key - the secret [identification, support, development, protection, financing, networking, and promotion] of a great leader with an [radical, effective, dedicated] team of [leaders, philosophers, visionaries, revolutionaries].

Another key lesson from their Tsarist past, and their own revolutionary experience, was the importance of information - and [torture, blackmail, false allegiances] to get it, and the skilled use of disinformation and propaganda to both motivate and to undermine. Many Communist revolutionaries had been tortured and imprisoned for challenging the late Tsarist regime, so they were "experts from the wrong side" on the effectiveness of these "dark skills".

And not to be under-estimated is the power of a vision and a great hope for something better, at any price. Visions and hopes make followers and fools of essentially all intellectuals. Keep these issues in mind, as the basis of the current film is that the same ploy was to replayed at a much greater scale by

the Communists on the Western powers.

Bolsheviks_in_Berlin

Unsurprisingly, the conditions in Germany were ripe for collective rebellion and activism. Patriotism for the exiled Kaiser was still strong and perhaps dominant, but a leading alternative in Germany as elsewhere was Communism. The Communist ideology was perhaps a more natural fit for industrial Germany than for dominantly rural Russia, and the success of Communism in Russia was an inspiration for many working Germans.

Soviet-supported and organised Bolsheviks had been building "Soldiers and Workers Councils" throughout Germany in the post-war years, with the first "Soviet Congress of Germany" meeting in Berlin in December 1918 [1]. The reigning Social Democrats were threatened by their Bolshevik cousins, as were all other Germany political organisations such as the small Nazi party. But the rapid growth and increasing power of the Bolsheviks was to some extent held in check by the Army and "Friedkorps" nationalist and patriotic WWI ex-servicemen that they supported.

By 1923, "... *Lenin was no longer taking part in governing the USSR or directing the Comintern. Stalin had seized almost all the reins of government, although the fact that he had done so had not yet been grasped by the country, the world, or even by his rivals. ...*" .

The Communists were strong contenders in the battle for control of Germany, with immense popular and especially labour support, a very strong and active organisation, and critical influence through their power of labour strikes, mass demonstrations, and promotions. In the words of Joseph Stalin "*in 1927 ... The German Commission of the Comintern, consisting of Zinoviev, Bukharin, Stalin, Trotsky, Radek, and a number of German comrades, took a series of specific decisions that direct assistance be given to the German comrades to enable them to seize power. ...*" [3]. "*... The resources which were allotted to them were enormous. The Politburo decided at a secret meeting that nothing would be spared. ...*" [4] .

Stalin's first objective in Germany was to destroy the German Social Democrats and pacifists, "*... who were distracting the proletariat from revolution and war. ...*" [5].

1. Shirer 1959. p54
2. Suvorov 1988 p2.01
3. Stalin 1927a, in Suvorov 1988 p2.01
3. Suvorov 1988 p2.01
3. Suvorov 1988 p2.02

Nazi_phoenix_from_ashes_and_rubble - Hitler's emergence as a socialist leader

Discontent_and_anger

From the ashes and rubble of the Great War of 1914 to 1918, the Allied victors, and in particular France, were anxious to ensure that a powerful Germany could never again rise to drive the world to destruction, or at least to do them harm. The Versailles Treaty set strict limitations on Germany's military capabilities and onerous taxes to repay the astronomical war damages. The League of Nations was also formed as an international cooperation to better organize efforts to avoid similar situations from arising, and as a basis for international collaborations to address other international issues. The Versailles Treaty had a tremendously depressing effect on the German economy, and generated deep resentment among Germans towards Allied powers and "Their" damned treaty.

But was this oppression the key driver of the eventual rejuvenation of German power? Or is this theme a partial answer only, effective because it plays on post-WWII Allied feelings of guilt and after-analysis of the post WWI period? Conquered nations are a constant product of the march of history, but the conditions and results often lead to vastly different outcomes than for post-WWI Germany. Perhaps the ancient Greeks and Holy Roman See are different examples of accommodating and re-directing conquered states within a greater system, and the quick resurrection of powers. But great conquering civilisations such as ancient Persia, the Inca, Aztec, Romans, Mongols, and Islam have a different lesson to tell, one that suggests that perhaps the victors of the Great War were anomalously accommodative with the Treaty of Versailles, that it is not always historical practice to spare a great rising power, a fierce and obvious pride and independence of collective soul. Destruction, dispersion, and direct subjugation is common. For all their tribulations, the Germans could clearly not complain about that.

From_artist_to_socialist_revolutionary

In a nation of discontent and countless political agitators, Adolf Hitler searched for a new life-role following his decorated performance as a corporal in WWI. In spite of his clear talent as an artist, he was denied entry to the Vienna Academy of Arts, which was a huge shock to Hitler, who was convinced that he would succeed. Hitler was also rejected from training as an architect. I wonder if he would have also excelled as an architect if he had been given the chance. Whether or not Nazi-built architecture was influenced by Hitler's creativity is a question not delved into here.

On invitation, Hitler joined a small fledgling Socialist revolutionary group called the German Workers' Party [1]. The initial group of less than 100 would-be revolutionaries was led by an active committee of seven including Hitler.

On April 1st 1920, the party was renamed "National Socialist German Worker Party" [2], and Hitler's brilliance as an orator, organizer, propagandist, and leader became clear. A special advantage of the Nazis was that early funds flowed in as a result of Hitler's inspirational speeches, and that ties to patriotic German military contacts brought in much-needed large chunks of funding [3]. Furthermore, the Army and judiciary were curiously kept somewhat independent within the Weimar constitution, forming a kind of state-within-a-state. And Hitler's background, patriotism, inspirational speeches, and obvious leadership abilities found favor with a few key supporters within the Army.

1. Shirer 1959. pp35-40
Anton Drexler - locksmith then Munich railroad shops. founder of "Committee of Independent Workmen", branch of N. German association
Karl Harrer, - newspaper reporter, led "Political Workers Circle",
German Workers' Party - merge of Drexler & Harrer, Karl Harrer was first chairman
Captain Ernst Roehm - homosexual "like many early Nazis", had joined before Hitler, officer of army in Bavaria - protected Hitler
Dietrich Eckart - often called "spiritual founder of Nazism" - leader of GWP "must be a bachelor - then we'll get the women...", also working class
Gottfried Feder - construction engineer & economic crank,
Hitler was seventh member of Committee
(I am missing one name!!)
First few meetings - same seven people, Hitler promotes - then a hundred and eleven - Hitler spoke and donations flowed in
2. Shirer 1959. p47
01Apr1020 GWP renamed to National Socialist German Workers' Party"
Hitler was true socialist - and adopted Social Democrats' "infamous spiritual and physical terror", started disrupting other political movements
3. Shirer 1959. p46 Roem persuaded Major General Ritter von Epp to raise \$ for the newspaper, most likely from Army secret funds

Yet_another_tough_socialist_party

The immediate heckling and violence by Bolsheviks and Social Democrats against the small German Workers Party [1] forced Hitler to build a corps of ex-servicemen to protect meetings of the fledgling party. In the summer of 1920, this was formalized as the "Ordnertuppe" under Emil Maurice, which disguises itself as the "Gymnastic and Sports Division" of the party. The Ordnertuppe was officially renamed to "Sturmabteilung" on October 15th 1921, now under the command of Johann Ulrich Klintzich. Both Klintzich and many of his brown uniformed storm troopers came from the Frikorps [2].

Now that the Nazis had the brawn they needed to survive the onslaughts of their Bolshevik and Socialist cousins, they could also take their game to the next level and adopt the socialist tactic of disrupting the activities and organisation of other parties, and to effectively organise their own public marches and demonstrations. The tiny Nazi party with a tough leader, was now a fullfledged, tough, socialist party. One must be fair to the socialists in the sense that they had borrowed some of the techniques from fallen European monarchists. Taking it far beyond that to emulate their Russian cousins would have to wait until one of them took political power in Germany.

At least the socialist and military origins of the Nazi party gave them these critical strengths. That was not the case for the hapless mainstream, middle-of-the-road German political parties who, although they were collectively dominant, had consciences that disadvantaged them in hard competition. Of 30 million votes for the January 19, 1919 elections of the National Assembly, Social Democrats obtained 46%, giving socialists the largest block of the votes, but not the majority. The two main middle-class parties obtained a combined 38% of the votes [3]. These two middle class parties were the Roman Catholic Church's "Center Party", and the "Democratic Party" which included the left wing of the

National Liberals. "... Both parties professed support for a moderate, democratic Republic, though there was considerable sentiment for an eventual restoration of the monarchy. ..." [4]

1. Shirer 1959. p40 24Feb1920 at Hofbrauhaus seating almost 2,000, fights with Communist & Socialist agitators when Hitler tried to speak 25 points (principles) of GWP - Hitler most honest politician in history? He did almost all
2. Shirer 1959. p42
3. Shirer 1959. p55
4. Shirer 1959. p56

Yet_another_loud_socialist_party

While Hitler hated the pro-Russian sympathies of the Social Democrats, he carefully studied that movement and its techniques.

As described by William Shirer, during Hitler's Viennese years from 1909 to 1913 : "... *At home he began to read the Social Democratic press, examine the speeches of its leaders, study its organisation, reflect on its psychology and political techniques, and ponder the results. He came to three conclusions which explained to him the success of the Social Democrats : They knew how to create a mass movement, without which any political party was useless; they had learned the art of propaganda among the masses; and, finally, they knew the value of using what he calls "spiritual and physical terror. ..."* [1].

In Mein Kampf, Hitler describes a mass demonstration by Vienna workers "... *For nearly two hours I stood there watching with bated breath the gigantic human dragon slowly winding by. ...*" [1]

How did the early Nazis want OTHER people to see them? We must look at their promotional material, and this is clear and simple. In some cases, you have only to start with a Communist poster, change the wording from Russian to German, then switch Stalin's portrait to that of Hitler, and you will end up with a Nazi poster. However, as the charming luster of Communism is tarnished by news of Stalins actions, and perhaps to better build their own political brand, the Nazis drop such a direct allusion to their heritage. But they never abandoned their Socialist title, and in essence Nazism was a softer variant of Communism that was easier to sell to voters.

"... *Hitler, the frustrated artist but now becoming a master propagandist, came up with an inspiration that can only be described as a stroke of genius. ...*" [2] - the swastika emblem of Nazism. As with other Socialist movements, or for that matter any successful conceptual-political movement like Soviet Communism, a regular newspaper was established, and wealthy individuals began to contribute funds, connections, and key members of the party [3,4].

Hitler's genius for propaganda was unrivaled, but it was his oratory that took the combination of all propaganda efforts to a completely different level.

- 1 Shirer 1959. p22
- 2 Shirer 1959. p43
- 3 Shirer 1959. p46 Ernst (Putzi) Hanfstaengel - American mother, wealthy family owned art-publishing business - 1000\$ - fabulous sum see also Goering below
4. Shirer 1959. p47
Rudolf Hess - son of a German wholesale merchant domiciled in Egypt, anti-Semitic, stirred Hitler with prize-winning essay : "How must the man be constituted who will lead Germany back to her old heights?"
Alfred Rosenberg - son of a shoemaker, German Estonian descent, Moscow studies, flirted with idea of becoming Bolshevik,

"intellectual leader" and "philosopher" of Nazi Party, hated Jews and Bolsheviks
Hermann Goering - great WWI war heros, married into wealth

Beer_Hall_Putsch

By March 1923, "... *Most of the men who were to become Hitler's closest subordinates were now in the party or would shortly enter it. ...*" [1].

On November 8th, 1923, Hitler's Nazis executed the famous "Beer Hall Putsch" in Munich [2], directly challenging established authority, backed up by over three thousand storm troopers at the scene, and many others at other strategic points in Munich. This attempt was a miserable failure, and led to Hitler's imprisonment. Keep in mind that Hitler was far from being the only political/military leader to attempt a putsch in Germany during this period! Segments of the Army and the Communists both fostered several uprisings, and several troublemakers went to jail. Is it fair to say that the main drivers of upheaval were the Socialists, and that the patriotic army reacted out of necessity?

The Beer Hall Putsch led to Hitler's arrest, trial, and imprisonment for four and a half years. From an historical point of view, this is very reminiscent of his socialist predecessors : Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, ? and Bakunin? to name a few, his crimes and punishment were in line with the thinking of the 19th century revolutionaries.

1. Shirer 1959. p47
2. Shirer 1959. p68-75

Mein_Kampf

But also important for history is that his imprisonment gave him the time to recount his personal history and political thoughts to fellow Nazi inmate Rudolph Hess, who was the principle scribe to write down the future Fuehrer's thoughts in Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" [1].

Hitler was anti-Communist and specifically anti-Marxist, but perhaps only in the sense that he was intensely patriotic and against the thought of a Russian-controlled German Communist party. But it does NOT make sense to say that he was against the Communist ideology, which his thinking resembled, including his militarist and dictatorial leanings, more than anything else. He certainly wasn't monarchist, industrialist, capitalist (which is NOT inherently industrialist!), democrat, nor religious.

After all, the word "Nazi" stands for "National Socialist Party", much like the greater Eastern block later called themselves the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". His early and later funding by wealthy individuals, industrialists, and conservative organisations followed the path already established by the Bolsheviks. His intolerance of other political views, societal upheaval, and violence was clearly mainstream socialist.

1. Shirer 1959. p???

The Communists' Invisible Hand in Hitler's rise to power

Hitler_on_the_radar_screen

Like him or not, even at this early stage Hitler was an outstanding leader, with clear intentions and enormous potential. Firm, committed members, support and funding was growing rapidly for the Nazi party, and as we have seen his enemies had already been taking strong actions to quash him. Anyone seeking to build or sustain political power in a fomenting, post-war Germany had to take Hitler into account, either in terms of quashing him, defending against him, or perhaps, if all else failed, use him to their advantage.

Although the evidence at this point is purely circumstantial, it is now time to consider the core theme of this film : that Russian Communists had early on [identified, selected] Hitler as a very interesting candidate among many Germans for indirect and direct [support, protection, networking with powerful contacts, political promotion]. Obviously German Bolshevik leaders would also have been considered, but as we shall see soon they may not have been the preference of the Russians. But the Russians would also have had several alternative plans to run simultaneously to gain control.

In fact, my first crazy hunch of the core theme was a combination of a biography on Joseph Stalin, followed by confirmation from a biography of Mao Zedong, both claiming a far earlier and greater role of the Russian in the [support, protection, networking with powerful contacts, political promotion] of Mao than I had ever read. Mao had many personality problems, many of which were likely precisely the strengths that Josef Stalin was looking for. There could be no guarantee of ultimate control over China's leader, so it was important to have the right type of character in place for the future of world Communism.

So let's take a closer look at Adolph Hitler, to see if he was the right type of independent leader, with the right objectives and dispositions, to suit Russia's intentions for Germany. Keep in mind as we are doing so, that the Communists were clear about their aspirations for world domination through conflict, and were organised internationally to pursue that goal.

1. Shirer 1959. pp??

The_right_stuff_for_the_Communists

Hitler's anti-Semitism differed from the sentiments of some socialists, but certainly not all and perhaps not even the majority at the time . But he wasn't just racist against Jews, as history illustrates so well, and the worst extremes in his sentiments were not manifested until after the beginning of WWII. Nor by any means were the Nazis alone in their anti-Semitism, which is an important issue even today in Western European and American nations [1,2], especially in some ethnic and religious communities but also within the general populations.

Ironically, as a separate theme that will not be covered in this film, anti-Semitism was and is also rife in

Communism, a political belief system with considerable Jewish input. Even before the start of the war, based on their own long experience with class, ethnic, and political groups, the Communists taught the Nazis how to build and operate concentration camps [3]. During the war, Jews who had escaped Eastward from Nazi controlled territories were rounded up by the Soviets. The Soviets shipped the Jewish families back to the Nazis, knowing full well the fate that awaited them [?]. Some authors believe that just before his death, Stalin was well underway with a major initiative to eliminate Jews in the Soviet Union [?].

Apart from anti-Semitism, Hitler held strong opinions on a number of other issues. According to William Shirer, in the early days of Hitler's adulthood and with his involvement in the German Workers Party, Hitler already clearly stated his intentions :

- Hatred for the Versailles Treaty imposed in 1919, and resentment against the Allied powers who imposed it.
- Break, but not occupy, the French
- Lebensraum - the intent to take chunks of Russia and her vassal border states, to provide needed land for a growing German population
- Dislike for democracy, and a strong preference for a Hitler-led dictatorship

There is plenty of basis for hating Hitler, and perhaps it's natural to cast everything about the man in dark and derogatory terms. But Western intellectuals have let this cloud their judgement beyond reason. Why is it that historical comments are twisted to the opposite of an obvious reality concerning the many outstanding and brilliant talents of Hitler? Why are Western intellectuals so lost in ad hominem thinking that they allow their hatred of the man, even though well-deserved, to dishonestly describe who and what he was? Why does Hitler always take the blame for what others drove him to, or for which they also were guilty? The point here is not that Hitler wasn't violent and egotistical, but that we have to be honest. As just one example, it is clear that he was a physically and mentally tough and courageous soldier who was not afraid to jump into extreme danger, nor to use a gun, notwithstanding foolish comments regarding his flight from the Beer Hall Putsch debacle [x]. Hitler was also a brilliant man, a trait that he exhibited across a very wide range of subjects.

1. ?New York Jew that toured Germany?
2. Dutch Jew who emigrated to Dallas, USA "Call me Mom"
3. ?Soviet Story?

2. Shirer 1959. pp67-80
2. Shirer 1959. p79
- x. Shirer 1959. pp30

"He was twice decorated for bravery. In December 1914 he was awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class, and in August 1918 he received the Iron Cross, First Class, which was rarely given to a common soldier in the old Imperial Army."

ICEBREAKER

Up to this point in the film, it has been a purely speculative supposition that the Russian Communists had early on [identified, selected] Hitler as a very interesting candidate, among many. for indirect, and indirect [support, protection, networking with powerful contacts, political promotion].

As stated earlier, Stalin's first objective in Germany was to destroy the German Social Democrats and pacifists, "... who were distracting the proletariat from revolution and war. ..." [1]. "... The Nazis had to be supported: leave it to the Nazis to eliminate the Social Democrats and the pacifists; let the Nazis start another war and destroy every state in Europe, every political party, every parliament, every army, and every trade union. In 1927 Stalin already foresaw that the Nazis would come to power and he considered that this would be a positive event. ..." [2]. Stalin stated that "... It is precisely this fact which will lead to an exacerbation of the internal situation in the capitalist countries and to the workers coming out in favour of the revolution. ..." [3].

"... The part which Stalin played in the Nazi's seizure of power was considerable. As Leon Trotsky said in 1936, '... Without Stalin there would have been no Hitler, there would have been no Gestapo.' ..." [4]. In 1938 Trotsky said "... Stalin finally untied Hitler's hands, as well as those of his enemies, and thereby pushed Europe towards war. ..." [5].

"... For Stalin, German Nazism was an instrument which would break a path for the revolution through solid ice - an icebreaker. German Nazism could begin the war and the war would lead to revolution. Let the icebreaker break Europe! Hitler could do what it did not suit Stalin to do. Stalin stated in 1927 that the second imperialist war was quite unavoidable, just as unavoidable, in fact, as the entry of the Soviet Union into that war. However, he did not want to take part in it himself from the first day. ..." [6]. Stalin proclaimed "... We shall move, but we shall be the last to move, in order to throw our weight on to the scales and tip the balance. ..." [7]. "... The more crimes Hitler committed in Europe, the better it would be for Stalin and the more reason he would have one day to send the Red Army into Europe as her liberator. ..." [8]. Stalin's ruse still fools Western intellectuals to this day.

At present, Suvorov is the only source that I know of for this information, so one can justifiably question its credibility. But if true, this is a far-from-subtle foundation for the central theme of this film - that Hitler was Joseph Stalin's puppet on a chain. Perhaps this was unwitting, or perhaps Hitler had long been aware of his "Uncle Josephs" role, and believed that it would be an easy feat to turn the tables on his benefactor at the appropriate time.

1. Suvorov 1988 p2.02
2. Suvorov 1988 p2.03
3. Stalin 1927b quoted in Suvorov 1988 p2.03
4. Trotsky 1936 quoted in Suvorov 1988 p2.03
5. Trotsky 1938 quoted in Suvorov 1988 p2.03
6. Suvorov 1988 p2.04
7. Stalin ?1927c? quoted in Suvorov 1988 p2.04
8. Suvorov 1988 p2.04

Moscow_needs_the_brown_shirts

If I remember correctly, one book provides a second stunning support for our central theme. I thought that it was William Shirers book "Rise and fall of the third Reich", but I could not find it again in that work. Whichever book it was, in the prelude to winning power in Germany, the "Brown shirts" (Nazis) were virtually at war with the "Red Shirts" (Communists) in the streets of Germany. While the Nazis were impressive and brutal fighters, based on hardened and patriotic Friedkorps soldiers originating from the rubble of WWI, they were vastly outnumbered by the German Communists. A point had been reached at which the Red Shirts were ready to finish off the Brown Shirts. Their leader ?name? sent a

telegram to Moscow stated their imminent intent to do so. The response from Moscow was clear : something to the effect ???"Lay off the Brown shirts. We need them to take power in Germany, to declare war on the Western Imperialist nations, and weaken them all to the point where the Red Army will roll through and conquer Europe"?????. The author of the book, intensely anti-Nazi but strangely sympathetic to the Communists, did not seem to understand of the significance of this telegram from Moscow.

Whiff_of_conspiracy

In the early stages of researching for this film, I had concluded from this simple and incomplete analysis of Hitler's rise to power, that there was sufficient reason to pursue the possibility that the Russian Communists played a substantial and strategic role in driving Hitler's early political success, as well as with Hitler's ascension to power in Germany, and his engagement in war with the Western imperialist powers. .

endsection

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PART II

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Grand Cooperation - Beating Versailles and bringing the Communists into the industrial age

Democratic_Nazi_victory

Thanks to Stalin's intervention, the Nazis survived the street battles with the Communists. How many other examples of Moscows invisible hand are there before the consolidation of Nazi power? ... helping and guiding the Nazis, perhaps directly or indirectly, known or unknown to the Germans, critical or irrelevant? In any case, in ?month? of 1933, after several attempts the Nazis won the German ?federal? elections democratically. It was now time to translate visions and plans into concrete actions and advances, backed by the full authority and power of the state. The Nazis have promised to create jobs, to rebuild Germany, to make the country great once again. Long years of planning are ready to challenge the armies of the worlds best scientists, engineers, tradesmen, operators, industrialists, and financiers. During the same period that the Japanese invade Manchuria, the Nazis launch their own first Blitzkrieg - but NOT on the battlefield. Instead, the onslaught begins in Germanys boardrooms, factories, research labs, schools, and streets. An under-employed and under-challenged population, hungry but proud and eager for action, awoken and energized, ready to take on the world.

Barriers_to_German_progress_on_the_inside_and_out

The Third Reichs revolution begins, and the revolution spills over the confines of the German constitution. So the constitution is changed. Reforms ripple through the political and administrative fabric of Germany, changing its nature and disposition. Internal reforms are not easy to get through, but it is done. But Germany, though awakened, is still weak economically and militarily, and is certainly in no position to challenge the major Imperialist-Capitalist powers one-on-one, let alone as an organised group, with or without the League of Nations. It is imperative that a means be found to build Germany, and especially its military, in defiance to the Treaty of Versailles and the watchful eyes of the "Imperialists-Capitalists". But was the solution already found and implemented years before the Nazis even came to power?

Fast_track_to_Russian_Industrialisation

Russian communists, never the friends of farmers, and friends only of Western intellectuals then as now, had succeeded in a dominantly agrarian country whose Tsarist ideology and practices most closely resembled their own. But to conquer the world you must be able to compete on the battlefield and in the markets, and to lead the proletariat they would have to build such a beast. They must build the country the Communist way, by eugenics of the classes (and races) as specified by Marx and Engels and promoted openly by playwright-intellectual ?name?, but more importantly by the anarchistic Nihilism of Bakunin. ??Lishenko comment?? This mantra is retained and repeated first by their disciples, and now by their implementors. But first they needed money, and then they needed technology, and both must come from the Imperialist-Capitalists they so despise. The obvious solution was to get the money from Russian resources, and from the Russian farmers, whom they also despised. To get the technology cheaply, an obvious solution was to utilise under-employed German scientists, engineers, and industrialists. Post-war, Wermac German had been keen out of desperation. The Communists plan were progressing well, sort of, but then Mother Nature intervened.

Communism_of_guns_not_people

The dirty thirties the world, exacerbated by a major climate phase change in ?1933? (Paul Vaughan). Strangely, in North America this although this was clearly identified as a major climate shift, it was perhaps mostly blamed on farming methods. In China, this was and is ignored by all but the Chinese. But in Russia, this was and is blamed on Communism and the collectivisation of farms. Here is a speculative hypothesis. Reduced farm output not only threatened cash receipts, at a time when the world desperately needed the food and was willing to pay, it also threatened the starvation of millions of Russians if the Communists weren't willing to stall their industrial revolution. They weren't willing to stall their industrial revolution, a decision not easy to take in Imperialist-Capitalist states, but a real advantage of Communism. Faced with the same decision decades later for the Chinese "Great Leap Forward", in ?1958? Mao Tse Tung declared in a secret Central Committee proclamation "... This may cost the lives of ?30% or 200 million people?, but I am willing to pay the price ...". How dramatic a personal commitment of a Communist Leader. He didn't, by the way, starve. But if you were Joseph Stalin in 1932, and your decision was to let 10 to 20 million Communists die of starvation, who would you let starve? Why not combine an economic imperative with a political solution? In any case, whatever the reasoning, Ukrainian kulaks bore more than their fair share of the cost. I'm sure that they are still proud of their commitment and contribution, not just the kulaks, but also the ghosts from Ukrainian-only cities that are now Russian-only, and parts of Russian territory.

Matched_weaknesses_can_be_a_collective_strength

As the central theme of this film suggests, the political success of the Nazis would not have been a surprise to the Communists, but instead would have elicited a frustrated cry of "... Finally, its about time! ...". I suspect that neither the Nazis nor their parents, the Communists, had to do any more thinking beyond their years of planning and expectations. But I do suspect that they did have to do a great deal of extremely hard bargaining. This would have been a tougher challenge for the Nazis, facing a poor, revolutionary nation with a penultimate chess play at the helm. An industrial explosion resulted, allowing massive "hidden" Nazi factories to be built out of sight. This provided the Nazis with the military equipment they needed, as it provided Communists with an industrial capacity that

they would take over anyways, and a means of training and developing vast armies of scientists, engineers, and a construction industry and its leaders, operators, logistics, and administrators.

You_cant_see_what_you_dont_want_to_see !!!!nyet - the buildups were overt and broadcast - not hidden!!!!

As ?E.P. Barnum? stated, "... You can fool some of the people all of the time, all of the people some of the time, but you cant fool all of the people all of the time. ..." [→ delete? *He may have been overly optimistic, but "... some of the people ..." definitely includes intellectuals, politically-correct thinkers, and cowards and traitors would dont want to see an ugly reality coming. That includes all of us in at least some areas.* <-] Was it really possible to hide activity on such a scale, even in a society as secretive as the Russian Communist state or the Nazis, even with lies as skilled as we tell ourselves? Clearly not from people like Winston Churchill and George Orwell, but clearly affirmative for Western intellectuals and Franklin Roosevelt his administration. But a culpable belief can avoid some nasty decisions. But to collaborate in the manner that they did, even given possible years of planning and discussions, one would assume that the Nazis and Communists had to trust one another - more the Nazis than the Communists. Of all people, neither Hitler nor Stalin were such fools, but they had to be temporarily foolish of necessity.

The_dark_side_of_organisation

While agrarian, the Russians had no shortage of brilliant people. Leaving aside technology, a particular strength dating back to the Tsarist years, and amplified by the Communists, was the organisation of systems of control. Two chilling examples of where they probably taught the Nazis a thing or two were the ?NKVD? and their "goulag archipelago". That the goulags were a model for the Nazi concentration camps seems to be supported at least by one account, and one has to wonder to what extent the Gestapo and Nazi secret services may have taken at least some inspiration and detail from the Communists.

endsection

Super-Leader on a chain - Aim in the general direction of the enemy and fire

Race_to_build_before_the_Allies_awaken

In a few short years, the Nazis had built an industrial-military complex to rival and overshadow even the Japanese and Russians, who had a much longer lead time, albeit starting from a deeper established base. The scientific and engineering explosion associated with their efforts re-asserted German dominance in those fields, and German pride was on fire.

Low_hanging_fruit_and_Not_so_collective_defense

War is enormously expensive in strategic resource consumption, demands on production capacity, loss of highly effective troops, and financing. It is far easier and cheaper to conquer isolated weaker, exposed targets on-by-one. Often this can be achieved merely by the threat of force, if that threat is perceived to be real, overwhelming, and devastating. The Nazis' overt displays of military capability, such as the Nuremberg rallies, plus perhaps more importantly their well-known historical might since the Bismark era, left little doubt in anyone's mind that their threat was real, overwhelming, and devastating. That in spite of their systematic advances in Austria and Czechoslovakia without having to fight a war. So it was easy for the Nazis to play to the limit of culpability of the Allies and their leaders, snacking one by one on the smaller members of the League of Nations, [??? wording relying on the foolish hopes of democracies and their leaders that everything can be accomplished by talking. ???]

Germanys_nemesis_a_War_on_two_fronts

As described by ?author - next 50 years?, other than rivers there are few natural barriers to marching armies across the plains of ?name?, encompassing Germany, Poland, ?etc etc?. This is a stark contrast to Britain - protected by the sea and built on naval power, France - protected by the seas on three sides and the Alps for a good portion of the fourth, Italy - isolated by mountains and seas, and Russia during the period that only the European powers presented a real threat. German history, and in particular World War I, screamed that the Germans must avoid a war on two fronts at all costs. There is no way to guarantee this as pacts and alliances shift the the course of war, and nations seek to minimize the maximum damage their friends and foes may cause them. Whatever the Nazis decided, it must delay the onset of a two-front war as long as possible. Whatever they decided, they had better have plans for neutralizing one of two fronts should the situation arise. A second Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was less likely, but the Communists in general, and Stalin in particular, did have legions of silent internal enemies. Rapid success to the West was a very attractive option. This may have been Hitler's wishful thinking, but reinforced by his generals, who may have thought it possible, but perhaps more importantly knew it was dangerous to disagree with a plausible stretch target. But a second option was to attack to the East, seeking Slavic lands as had long been the Nazis' primary target for land. The

second option had the advantage of facing a far weaker, less wealthy and less formidable opponent than the Western-Imperialist-Capitalist-Democracies (WICDs). It had the disadvantage of facing well-prepared, massively well-armed, brutal and experienced opponent with a leader that was beyond cunning and brutal, in total control of his nation, who had a close and direct line of access to the critical Romanian oil fields, and who knew almost as much about Nazi capabilities and ongoing plans as did Hitler.

Russias_nemesis_a_War_on_five_fronts

Following their subjugation of Tartars off the steppes, the Tsars of Russia often had visiting headaches from the West, including King Charles Gustafs Swedes, King ?name? Poles, Emperor Napoleon Bonapartes French, and Kaiser ?? Wilhelms Germans. Tsar Nichols ?yikes - I forget he family name!!? humiliating defeat by the Germans in World War I, and failure to protect the motherland, was in no small measure a contributor to the fall of the Tsarist regime and the rise of the Communists. Years of bloody internal wars and campaigns against internal resistant and externally-supported attacks, together with years of developing and promoting the Nazis, could easily lead to the same fate. Still, when you pick a violent mad-man to lead another country, you're not going to have fall-back plans.

???????????? - War on five fronts historically

To_each_his_own_wild_cards - Rudyard Kiplings stork and crocodile

In the discussions and negotiations with Allied nations prior to the outbreak of World War Two, was there really as much flexibility available to either the Communists or the Nazis as one might think? Or were the supposed options really a smoke-screen, hiding an unshakable and long-ordained Nazi-Communist-Japanese Axis? That I don't know. But what seems fairly certain is that it hardly seems possible that Stalin or Hitler could possibly believe anything other than their greatest potential threat was likely their partner.

A Rudyard Kipling tale tells of a stork strutting along mud banks of a river. He sees a crocodile basking not too far away. The stork keeps an eye on the crocodile, and the crocodile keeps an eye on the stork. The crocodile is thinking of lunch, and the stork knows. The crocodile knew that the stork knew. But the stork knew that the crocodile knew that he knew, and so on..

The central theme of this film is that the Communists played a key, but certainly not exclusive, role in the rise to power of Hitler and the Nazi party. But timing is everything, and in spite of recent collaborations between the Nazis and the Communists, clearly neither could fully trust the other. Importantly, one might conjecture that the Communists had better espionage on the Nazis, than the reverse. Wars clearly need a military, but they are won with espionage, the skills to analyze it, and the ruthlessness to apply it surreptitiously. On top of the substantial uncertainty regarding each other, Allied intentions, clouded by their indecision and slow but sure preparations for war, kept uncertainty high and options open.

Nazis_with_no_friends

This period of frantic negotiations, secret, shifting alliances, and rising and dashed hopes would almost be comic if it hadn't been so ominous and serious. Perhaps 70 plus years later we can afford to laugh. A particularly effective image is that of Neville Chamberlain triumphantly waving his Treaty with Hitler, confident that everlasting peace was guaranteed. This is what both he and the public so desperately wanted to believe. Both Hitler and Stalin knew that and used it. But in the end, Hitler wasn't subtle, wasn't adept at ambiguous statements and negotiations that could be interpreted by others as they wished to hear things, and wasn't going to be able to neutralize his Western front with words and agreements.

Now Hitler needed a solid, written agreement with Stalin, but this was frustratingly slow in coming. It was August 1939, and soon his Polish invasion plans would have to be put off a critical year if Stalin didn't align with him. At the last minute, the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement cemented the partnership, and an agreement to invade Poland on ?01 September 1939? was reached only two weeks before the invasion. Hitler now had a friend, the same one who had been with him from the start.

Joint_attack_of_perfect_direction_and_conditions

WWII wouldn't have made sense if it DIDN'T fit the Communists reason for starting it, their reason for developing Hitler and the Nazis! While the wild cards might possibly have led to a different outcome, it should be no surprise that in the end, the war plans were of perfect conditions, direction, timing, and with the perfect organization, attitudes, and capabilities at the apparent lead. Perfect, that is, for the Communists, far more so than for the Nazis.

Late_for_the_party_to_dupe_Western_intellectuals

What if you and your buddies planned a war, and nobody showed up? Perhaps Hitler should have felt that way on 01 September 1939, when Stalin informed him on the date of invasion just two weeks after they agreed, that the Russians "weren't ready". But perhaps Hitler never gave it a second thought, Russians holding no candle to German reliability and punctuality, so he charged right in. It took a certain genius to realize that a ploy so simple could lead to the entire blame for the initiation of the war to be put on Hitlers shoulders, that this could totally dupe essentially all Western intellectuals essentially forever, or at least until real thinkers dug out the truth. Genius, perhaps, but a practiced genius. A short while later, the blame for the massacre of 15,000 Polish officers at Katyn was also successfully put on Hitlers shoulders alone. Perhaps Stalin always got a bit of chuckle out of these ploys, but also perhaps he grew weary and bored of leading unlearning fools by the nose. '

endsection

Too quiet on the Eastern front - Why Operation Sea Lion and Britain never mattered

Fools_in_surprise

Hitlers failure to proceed with Operation Sea-Lion signaled a complete change in the motivations and directions of the war, but an inevitable change that both Hitler and Stalin would have anticipated long before the war began. It is a given that war must be a series of surprises, in spite of the best of plans and execution. But was the timing and circumstance really much of a surprise to either?

If Hitler had never realized the extent to which his own fortunes and those of the Nazi party were beholden to Stalin, and how his success was a mere ingredient in Stalin's much larger and much greater plan, did he realize it now? If so, that would have been a big surprise, or more appropriately, a big, sudden suspicion. But it would not have been out of line with his long-standing expectations that one day he would have to turn on Stalin. In any case, without an over-whelming sense of immediate threat, it seems highly unlikely that Hitler would pause in mid-conquest, ignore the main apparent hurdles to his expansion and success, and deliberately start a new major war on a second front.

If the central theme of this film is at least partially correct, then Stalins greatest surprise may have been that his “unwitting puppet”, Hitler and the Nazi party, was as effective and well-directed as it had been in the year of the Blitzkrieg. A faltering advance at the English Channel would have been considered since the earliest years of pre-war planning, the preparations would have been long in place. But perhaps by the autumn of 1940, Stalin really did believe that Hitler could not possibly pass up the opportunity to finish off Britain, to demolish the three main hurdles to the next grand phase of the Third Reich's expansion : the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Battle of Oil. If that was the case, the a few months breather to the channel could be seen as an understandable delay, but no more than a few months. After that, Stalin could not afford to think that the change in the entire momentum and direction of the war was anything but a long-anticipated redirection of the Nazis against Russia.

If anybody was truly surprised, then the only surprising surprises might have been that of Winston Churchill, his military leaders, the Japanese (who shared with the Nazis a common long-term Russian problem), and possibly that of a few American military leaders (but not its political leadership!) such as George Patton (but not Douglas MacArthur, who seemed surprised at everything).

Completely unsurprising surprises would have been that of Americas political leadership, essentially all Western intellectuals, and Mussolinis Italy.

endsection

Night of the longest knives - As with Yamamoto's Pearl Harbour, so then with Hitler's Barbarossa

A_race_long_started

Suppose that you entered a footrace where one athlete had already left the starting block long before it began (Stalin), and another had arranged with the race starter to put a silencer on the starting pistol, and to fire it even before the remaining runners had gathered at the start line (Hitler). Some of the runners scrambled to jump in after the silenced pistol fired when they saw that they were missing a race (Britain), and still others never heard of the race, even now some 70 plus years later (the USA and Western intellectuals)? This is a rough description of the very foundations of the Second World War and its initiation.

But the famously long delays of five-month period from February 1941 when the Nazis put everything into a massive re-organisation to attack Russia, and June 22nd 1941 when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa for the invasion of Russia.

Having initiated the war by proxy, thereby long having left the starting line, and having been assisted enormously by Germany in building their enormous and mostly hidden military, and now being at the point where the Western Imperialist nations, with the important exception of the still-uncommitted Americans, the Communists were in a run-away winning position. However, they had the disadvantage of having no battle experience against the Blitzkrieg and Nazi equipment and leadership, and they now critically needed the massive material support of the USA while at the same time being an Axis power up to that point. ?????? But at the end of the day, perhaps their greatest vulnerability was their misjudgment of just how desperate and determined the Nazis were to neutralize their lead, how forcibly obliged and willing Hitler was to open a second and fatal front, and just how fast the Nazis could turn around the entire basis of the Second World War.

The Nazis were second off the starting block, far behind the Communists. However, they had a superb, well-trained and battle-hardened military, the top military leadership in the world, much of the best engineering and technology, and the famous German penchant for precise organisation and execution. For at least part of the February to June period, the Nazis also had the advantage

The rest of the world were merely naïve spectators, unaware that they had far more at stake than they could imagine. For the most part, they could not even imagine it for the next fifty years that they were paying the consequences.

Barbarossa_as_the_night_of_the_longest_knife

In 1930?, Hitler turned on his loyal and critically important 'brown shirts' under 'name?'. The leadership and many troops were murdered, putting an end to their rising power within the Nazi party, and the potential threat they posed for Hitler. The maneuver was eerily reminiscent of the ongoing

series of purges long-practiced by the Communist, and in particular their penchant for regular purges of their secret service, and the threat it would always pose to leadership.

But the “night of the long knives” pales in scale compared to what Hitler now had to do - turn against his Communist allies, who had not only provided up until then a secure Eastern front, but whom had also been key to his own rise, but that of the Nazi party and the Third Reich. This would have been a difficult and dangerous decision, but an inevitable and expected one. Only the timing mattered. Hitler could not have been burdened with a sense of guilt.

The_Greatest_military_operation_that_never_was

Hitlers Barbarossa is sometimes described as the largest-scale military invasion in history. It may have been on an absolute scale of actual invasions, not taking into account its RELATIVE scale compared to the regions, or the worlds, resources at the time. I suspect that wars of antiquity actually involved a far high portion of people and resources than did Barbarossa.

Viktor Suvorovs book “Icebreaker : who started the Second Word War” not only provides a foundation for the current film and its central theme that Hilter and the Nazis were a necessary tool of Communism, it also provides a brilliant, detailed analysis of the Russian preparations leading into the war and up to the point of Barbarossa. He also describes the Nazi scramble from February 1941 through to the launch of Barbarossa in June, and points out that both sides had the same basic approach for preparing their invasions at one another.

From his analysis, it is clear that the Nazis forces in Barbarossa were actually SMALL compared to the largest invasion in modern history that had long been planned, prepared, and mostly ready to go by June 1941. That was the Communist takeover of all of Europe, ?Codename?, the invasion that Hitler, and the Nazi party, had been built from their early days to bring to a reality, by declaring war on the Western Imperialist nations, and to weaken both them and the Nazis to the point where Communist forces would conquer Europe and the world. From Suvorovs analysis it is clear that the Nazis very nearly achieved their inadvertent part of Stalins plan. The Nazis would have likely “super-succeeded” by Stalins measure if they had launched Operation Sea Lion to invade Britain. Instead Barbarossa preempted the super-massive ?name? Russian invasion. Barbarossa revealed the full reality of the moribund Russian invasion, stunning Barbarossas leaders, soldiers and airmen, who were in awe over what they saw.

The_ONLY_defense_is_a_good_offense

Suvorovs brilliant analysis provides multiple explanations why BOTH the Communists and Nazis demolished their defenses on the Nazis Eastern front. To start with, one cannot launch a massive all-out attack through ones own massive defense lines. At least in those days, your minefields were almost as great a barrier to your own massive attack as they are to the enemys attack. Huge defensive gun emplacements and infrastructure take up too many personnel and equipment that is essential to an overwhelming victory on enemy territory, and are of no use to an all-or-nothing gamble to win. And like the great Muslim victories against Western Europe, troops are best motivated by the desperate knowledge that there is no alternative to winning. The Communists had built the NKVD as a massive “behind the lines army”, sometimes better equipped than the regular armies, precisely to create an

equal or greater terror behind soldiers than in front of them, forcing a disciplined fight. The NKVD also provided a huge, well organised, trained, and planned insurgency for captured areas, that REQUIRED the use of torture and atrocities on the part of the Nazis, who could expect even worse if they were to be captured on the battlefield. Or as the world saw both before and after the war, individual citizens and cultures in any of the Communist countries could expect as much. This is a point that Hitler knew well and acted on, but which has never been understood by Western intellectuals, whose criticism rarely covers both sides of the story. As with concentration camps, the Nazis had been inspired by, and learned from, their Communist counterparts. Furthermore, from the time of Napoleon, stories of the unbelievable ability of starving, poorly led Russian soldiers to continue the fight were legendary. Hitler would have known that as well.

A_fluke_of_timing_or_espionage

Following 5 months of intensive scrambling by the Nazis to completely change their direction and prepare Barbarossa, it was perhaps a fluke of history, or perhaps again a result of superb highly deadly espionage, that the Nazis struck first. By Suvorov's guesstimate, Barbarossa was launched only two weeks to ?a month? before only the Communists own planned date. The "miracle of timing", plus the Nazis own state of partial preparedness, suggests that the timing may have been forced even more than it had looked back in February 1941. Perhaps the Nazis knew that the Communists knew that the Nazis had no winter gear or winterized equipment. And perhaps the Communists didn't know that the Nazis knew that the Communists knew that the Nazis didn't have winter clothing. In any case, it was the stork who struck the much larger crocodile, locking both in death-struggle that really had only one outcome, barring a miracle that Hitler had to gamble on.

But the Communists would have known that the Nazis knew that the Communists knew that the Nazis didn't have adequate access to oil, that the Nazis coal-to-oil plants were bombed and unreliable, and that the Nazis Romanian oil sources were all too vulnerable. This would later play out in the crucial split of Nazi forces between Stalingrad and the oil fields, with initial success in Stalingrad, and failure in the more important oil fields.

Your_enemy_is_now_your_enemies_enemy_and_your_friend

With the launch of Barbarossa, the entire basis to the Second World War had changed overnight. It seems inconceivable that even Stalin could possibly become an instant friend of the Allies, but he actually pulled off this amazing feat. This is perhaps not entirely surprising, necessity making bedfellows of the strangest partners, and Britain's survival was still far from being a given. What Stalin needed from his new allies was the immediate invasion of Western Europe. What he got was a delayed advance through Sicily and Italy, aided by the ineffective and outmatched response of Italian military. Still, the Allies Southern Europe invasion did lead to a crucial diversion of badly needed German personnel and equipment. But it didn't bleed the vulnerable and mauled home base of Britain. Perhaps his frustration over the delays of the Allies was well-founded - in a sense the Allies were letting the former Axis partners bet each others brains out, which was exactly the strategy Stalin used to have a chance of conquering Europe and the world.

But the German Blitzkrieg worked its special magic even over the vast distances in Russia, at least until the main bulwarks of Communist defenses were reached : Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Moscow. This

was certainly due in no small part to the critical element of surprise that the Nazis had achieved. Mainstream thinking erroneously attributes it to poor military leadership and planning, inadequate equipment, lousy technology, and unpreparedness. Suvorov's analysis of the Communists' equipment, training and technology seriously challenges this superficial mainstream thinking.

But was the initial success also due in part to Stalin's design? Having lost his main attack military, there was little advantage in pouring good troops and equipment into a losing front. A scorched earth policy robbed the Nazis of badly needed supplies and shelter. Huge numbers of NKVD insurgents leading both captured army and public subversives, and guaranteed that potential thoughts of Russian liberation from the Communists would give way to the forced and inevitable atrocities. The Blitzkrieg could not itself overcome the challenge of extremely stretched out and vulnerable supply lines, and the troop and equipment requirements to control captured territories far exceeded the worst-case scenarios of Western Europe, who were far more docile and accepting of conquest. Nor was the Blitzkrieg suited to urban gorilla warfare in the rubble of major cities. Not even mass starvation was sufficient to defeat the Communists, after all, they had long years of practice under the Communists. But Stalin would have foreseen that the initial, spectacular successes of the Nazis would have had a galvanizing effect on his new, wary allies. The situation amplified Allied fears, and forced their hand to provide the same kind of American material lifeline as Britain was receiving. Stalin didn't even have to pay for that. In a very short period, enemies had been converted wholesale to committed saviors. Brilliant.

Russias_super_winter_to_the_rescue

As per ?name? truism : "... Those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat it. ..." To which I add "... But those who learn the lessons of history, well they too are doomed to repeat it. ..."

Charles Gustav of Sweden and Napoleon Bonaparte of France are among would-be Russian conquerors who were defeated in no small part by the Russian winters. Every history and military buff knows that. In spite of his unpreparedness, Hitler would have known that as well, but didn't have much choice with the gamble. But far less well known is that the winters of defeat were not normal Russian winters, they had far more than the usual bite. Napoleons invasion occurred in the depths of the Dalton grand solar minimum of ~1790 to 1820, mild by the standard of other grand solar minima, but still a force to be reckoned with. As an example, the last real "summerless year", occurred in 1816. It is perhaps erroneously attributed to the after-effects of the Tambora volcanic explosion of 1815, roughly ten times the size of Krakatoa by some guesstimates. I suspect that the real basis was the Dalton minima, perhaps catalysed or assisted by the Tambora eruption, and perhaps not.

The 1940s was a period of relative warmth, not of a grand solar minimum. It did follow a major phase change in climate in ?1933?. Somewhat paradoxically for the idea of a major cold is that the fifty-year period of approximately ?1940 to 2000? marks the third highest level of solar activity over the last 11,000 years! But whatever the greater climate context may have been, as the graph of European continental temperatures in the twentieth century clearly shows, the fall of 1941 was a period of an intense, anomalous down-spike in temperature. Hitler knew he lacked preparedness for a normal Russian winter. What followed was perhaps more deadly than the Russian soldiers.

One can perhaps understand divine intervention to save Russia from Swedish and French invasions, but

the Communists had systematically murdered priests and suppressed religion. Assuming that the down-spike in 1941 was of divine origin, then why would this have occurred to save the Communists? Perhaps, as my Ottawa friend Ron ?Benz? suggested, God had become a Communist?

Admiral_Yamamotos_Pearl_Harbour

As the Nazi advance mired down in the Russian winter, and ran up against Leningrad and Stalingrad, and as the Japanese cleared out the Eastern Pacific and South-East Asia, the Nazis needed a major success and diversion of American power. To what extent that played in the timing of Pearl Harbour I don't know, Admiral Yamamoto famously commented on the probably impact of his orders echos eerily what Hitler and his military leaders must have felt many times over with the decision to invade Russia : “... I fear that we will awaken a sleeping dragon. ...”. The Japanese must have anticipated that a war with the Americans was inevitable, but the particular timing wasn't what they wanted.

It is a strange thing, that Winston Churchill's desperate attempts to push the Americans fully into war, the Nazis desperate need for a diversion for the Americans, and the Japanese obligation to assist their fellow Axis, seemingly only were forced at a the right time for Stalin? Conspiracy theories have suggested that Churchill may have deliberately withheld key information about the Japanese attack precisely to drag the Americans into war, although it does seem to me that the Americans themselves had all the information they needed to be ready. I have yet to see an analysis that the failure was not a failure that resembles good ears and hearing, nor even just bad listening skills, nor even just confirmational bias and preconceived beliefs, but perhaps appropriate nudges in the right direction at the right time, likely unknown to the decision maker, the puppet. Churchill might have somehow done that, but if ever such a process took place, the real master of the technique was Stalin. In any case, that is the core of the central theme of this film with respect to Hitler and the foundations of WWII, and Roosevelts role will be discussed in that context later in the film.

Most likely this is an illusion driven by my own bias, which is the central theme to this film, and my lack of detailed knowledge around the event. Its easy to become immersed in conspiracy theories, which seem mostly to serve as excuses for out own failures. For that reason I normally do not like to delve into them at all. But its a bit hard to imagine a “true” description of a war without conspiracy theory of some sort, as wars by nature must involve conspiracies. And keep in mind that the conventional explanations for the rise of Hitler and the Nazis, and the origins an motivations of the Second World War ARE conspiracy theories. In my view, this is not well enough recognized. “Multiple conflicting hypothesis” is my way of retaining a number of concepts, trying to avoid becoming a prisoner of concepts, instead of concepts simply being tools to use at my discretion. ...

The_rest_is_also_history

As noted several times previously, the central theme of this film is that Hitler and the Nazi party and the Second World War were, to an important degree extent, unwitting tools of Joseph Stalin. While built on shaky, incomplete, and somewhat incoherent ground, this theme has interesting, if circumstantial, points of support. At the very least, the course of events follows intentions apparently

stated decades before, and certainly fits in with a very strong, often repeated, long-term central objectives of the Communists to revolutionize the world. To the authors knowledge, that objective has never been officially dropped, ??? even by the short-lived “Communism with a human face” initiated by Gorbachev ???.

With the launch of Barbarossa, the course of the war from June 1941 through to the surrender of the Nazis in ?month? 1945, follows a plan that diverges from the original objectives set for the war and all of world. We'll close the “central theme” analysis at this point with the observation that even with his primary plan in ruins, Stalin still managed to out-think and out-negotiate Allied powers to the Communists advantage. The Communists were the overwhelming “victors” of new conquered territories, now encompassing all of Eastern Europe, including key areas such as the Balkans and control of the Straits of Bosphorus, giving Mediterranean access to their fleet. Japan had been neutralized and contained, and the addition of China to the Communist realm was well advanced, with overwhelming victory being attained within four years of the end of the war.

endsection

Parallels with the Rising Sun in the East

China_but_not_Mongolia

While the Nazis quickly dominated continental Western Europe during the first year of the war, on the other side of the world, but of less immediate concern to Europeans and Americans, the Japanese steam-rolled through China with equal speed and superiority. Their Southward thrust had been dictated by their stinging defeat at the Manchuria-Mongolia border at the hands of the famed Russian General Zhukov, in July 1939, more than a month prior to the onset of the European war. This led to a lop-sided Russian-Japanese pact, giving the Soviets some degree of protection in the East, just as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact protected them in the West. Both pacts had historical enemies sleeping in the same uncomfortable beds.

Hurdles_to_Japanese_security_and_expansion

Perhaps not surprisingly, the Japanese faced similar hurdles to their progress and security as the Nazis, although these hurdles would only begin in earnest after Pearl Harbour and the declaration of war against Japan. But as they knew war would come, Japanese planning and preparations had long preceded World War Two, and many point out that the second world war actually first began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in ?1933?, followed long after by the Nazi takeovers of Austria and Czechoslovakia. It's just that the Allies took years to pick up the gauntlet and join in.

Battle_of_Britain_and_the_US

Japan's very loose version of the "Battle of Britain" was the necessary conquest of British, Dutch, French, and American bases in the Eastern and South-Eastern Pacific, leaving a clear route to the oil, coal, iron ore, and aluminum of South-East Asia, Indonesia, and Australia.

Battle_of_the_Pacific

The Japanese version of the "Battle of the Atlantic" was the threat posed by British and American naval power, anchored notably in Hong Kong, Singapore, the Phillipines, Port Moresby, Australia, Midway, Pearl Harbour, and throughout Polynesia. However, at this stage of the war in the fall season of 1940, the isolation and conquest of China was the immediate Japanese imperative. This isolation of China was more easily achieved by Japanese naval power, not yet at war with the Americans and British, than in the case of the Nazis who faced the full force of superior American and British naval power, and whose fleet and naval bases were far too exposed to attack. Unlike the Japanese, the Germans had not built aircraft carriers.

Battle_of_Oil_for_Japan

The "Battle of Oil" was just as vital for the Japanese as it was for the Nazis, so it was crucial for them to gain total direct control over petroleum fields. The oilfields of Mongolia were in close proximity to Japan and Japanese-controlled Manchuria, but having been firmly and finally denied access to those sources by the Russians, the imperative of securing oil supplies in South-East Asia became paramount. Access to other strategic materials such as iron and aluminum, was also important. China did not have the needed oil supplies, but it did have huge people and material resources. Furthermore, an independent China was a potential threat to the Japanese power..

Curious_impediments

As a very curious side issue, the Japanese found themselves fighting some German-equipped Chinese soldiers. Furthermore, the Chinese Nationalist government found it difficult to fight against both the Japanese and the Chinese communists at the same time, which made it that much more impossible to resist the Japanese. The Communists claimed to be patriotically fighting the Japanese, but their actions said something VERY different. But unlike the French Communists' welcoming of the Nazis, at least the Chinese Communists pretended to oppose the Japanese. Already the Russian-Japanese bed-fellows, smiling on the outside, were exchanging furious kicks under the sheets.

endsection

Guess who almost had your ass, Guess who almost lost it for you, Guess who saved it

For_whom_the_stars_align

Pause for a moment, and think about the first year of WWII with the Westward thrust of the Nazis, the Southward thrust of the Japanese, and the strategic weakening of China and an occupied France by the activities of the Chinese Communists. Who benefited the most from this scenario? Was it really in the best long-term strategic interests of the Japanese or the Germans? Was it in the direction of Hitler's "Lebensraum" doctrine [1] to conquer Slavic lands for an expanding German population, established decades before? How comfortable were the Japanese to have a major power right at their doorstep, a power whose navy was famously defeated by the Japanese in 1905, but who had just clobbered them on the battlefield? Why were the Germans and Japanese at odds in China?

Perhaps most importantly, consider the timing of the war, with all Allies, even equipped with a "League of Nations" in place precisely to avert what happened, engaging in a war they tried to wish away, and joining in the fray far too late.

Did that go the advantage of either? But the Soviets clearly benefited from all of this.

1. Shirer 1959. , p82

The_Allies_should_have_lost_the_war

Many decades and generations after the war, a senior Polish-born Canadian engineer hosted dinner at his home with a senior German Swiss research contractor and myself as guests. Discussions went back to the Second World War and its aftermath. The German contractor pointed out that it still seemed unbelievable to many old Germans who survived the war that they could have lost. The over-whelming material wealth and equipment of the Americans were a huge part of this, but even then the Allied battlefield effectiveness was questionable.

There is perhaps more to this than the old German war survivors realize, but not necessarily to the advantage of the Germans of the time. An initial lack of preparation and resolve could easily have been fatal for the Allies, and very nearly was. But the greatest threat was Communist, and but for a timing glitch of only a few weeks, the outcome of the war could have run according to the long established plan. This would NOT have been to the advantage of the Nazis, and it would have led to a radically different world.

While technology was central to the battlefield successes, and the Nazis failed to develop or deploy in a timely manner several potential game-changers : more accurate long-range missiles, an ultra-heavy long-range bomber, vast numbers of Me262s as a jet fighter and not just a fighter-bomber, etc.

However, one technology stands well above the rest, and that was the atomic bomb. Of course, the atomic bomb was of German-Japanese origin, not Allied, and that could have easily tilted the balance. (Missing points here - espionage to derail the German program).? It seems that the Japanese actually were in advance over the Americans in their program, until American bombing at Nagoya Japan forced them to move it to Korea. As with timing of Barbarossa, it seems that a matter of only a couple of weeks, either a fluke of timing or the product of espionage meant that the Americans used it first. But most likely, by mid-August 1945, it was too late for the Japanese anyways, too much damage had already been inflicted, and an atomic war would have been to their disadvantage given one-sided access to major industrial and population centers. A years advance by the Japanese was entirely a possibility, and that would have been a different scenario.

In the unlikely event that Nazism could have survive and controlled much of Europe, would the Nazis have been a “gentler and kinder” master than the Communists? My own theme is that Communism is the foundation, Fascism was a very mild, accommodative, and nationalistic form of Communism, and Socialism is the form that must be sold to wary democracies. But in essence, they share the common character that “the collective” decides what everybody and organisation must think, how they should behave, and how they are organised. Nazism was extreme by necessity, by their Communist origins, and by necessity given their true parent and real enemy. But they were quite modest compared to Communism. Or, would a Nazism at peace have actually been simply Communism with a different name, or even with the same name? Nobody knows for certain.

Stalin_should_have_you_speaking_Russian_by_now

The central theme of this film is that Hitlers development and the rise to power of the Nazi party was in part a planned and active option of the Communists. That plan envisaged a German-launched war with the Western-Imperialist-Capitalist-Democracies, and the subsequent the weakening of them all to the point where the Red Army would roll through and conquer Europe, then the world. For a plan that was hatch at least by 1927, Hitler, in his unwitting role as Icebreaker, was everything Stalin hoped him to be, up until the point that Hitler refused to launch Operation Sea Lion.

Even if he didn't conquer the world, Stalins Communists still managed to make by far the greatest land gains of the war, and to capture the allegiance of a solid portion of Western academics, if not the Western public. To the extent that they influenced and still influence Western intellects, politics, and actions is another theme for someone else to cover. Stalins long shadow persisted for decades in Russia, perhaps more than we would like to think, in the rest of the world as well. Even if the central theme of this film is not correct, like him or not, Stalin still deserves the title of the dominant leader of the 20th century.

And it should also be recognized that Stalin very nearly owned your ass, according to THE Grand Plan for the Second World War, which was Stalins plan.

Roosevelt_as_both_traitor_and_hero

My own trail of pursuit progression that started with surprising comments in a biography about Stalin concerning his apparent role in Mao's [identification, development, promotion, networking, funding,

protection] from an early point in his career. This led to the central theme of this film, that Stalin developed and used Hitler in the same way. It now makes sense to at least introduce the idea that Franklin Delano Roosevelt's somewhat anomalous actions regarding the war, and those of his party and key political supporters, may not entirely be blamed on the American political scene. His behaviour, certainly up to the critical turning point of Barbarossa but also at Yalta shortly before his death, fit the Stalinist theme nicely, albeit in a fuzzy, unsupported way at present.

Roosevelt escaped proper culpability for his attitudes, beliefs, and central role in turning a major recession and climate shift into the Great Depression. Frankly, his philosophy and techniques resembled Socialism, with a twinge of fascism, under the convenient excuse of addressing a serious recession that he may have turned into the worst Depression of the last 100 years or so. But Roosevelt has also escaped potential blame for playing what seems to be a designated role in the near success of Hitler, but more importantly of Stalin. To begin with, while US materials, manufacturing and convoys were of critical importance at an early (but not immediate) stage of the war, the Americans did not fully and officially engage until Pearl Harbour, more than two years after its start. This situation was greatly to Hitler and Stalin's advantage. As Hitler rolled through Europe, Joseph Kennedy, father of the popular US President John F. Kennedy, had strongly argued that America should abandon Britain and accommodate the Nazis. Moreover, Roosevelt was key at Yalta in supporting Stalin's consolidation of power over much of Eastern Europe. America's role in China during and immediately after the Second World War came mostly after Roosevelt's death, but perhaps his legacy was at least an important part of why China fell to the unlikely Communists.

Altogether, Roosevelt's directions and actions played no small role in condemning most of the world's population to live in, or under the shadow of, a system that Roosevelt was at least partially sympathetic to (??? - is there any support for this???). But, as with Hitler, is it possible that Roosevelt and his power base were partially but critically a product of invisible design and guidance, at least with respect to issues and developments that were key to Stalin. Unlike Hitler, Churchill, and Patton (and later Mao Tse-Tung), but perhaps very much like Douglas MacArthur, I doubt that Roosevelt ever had what it takes to realize that at any point in his career, much less at the time when critical decisions had to be made concerning the course of the war and the building of the world.

One can only imagine what an American leader like Ronald Reagan could have achieved when the world needed him most. But it's easy to imagine that Roosevelt and his entourage very nearly lost your ass to the Communists.

Churchill_and_Hitler_as_co_heroes

That Churchill was a key leader and hero of the war is a near-universal and popular theme of Allied nations. Obviously, all nations had many heroes and villains, from all walks of life. But among national leaders, at least among the Anglophone nations, Churchill seemed to have a far clearer understanding of the games in play, and how to respond. Perhaps much of that was due to professional and effective groups in foreign affairs, war departments, and the intelligence communities. But his understanding went much further than just that. For example, in ? 1900 ?, Churchill supposedly stated that, ultimately, Islam might prevail, a point of view that I suspect was rare at the time, but which the intervening century has shown just how insightful he was. Apparently, that view was expressed in the ? 1920's? by famed British historian Arnold J. Toynbee (up until 2010, my favorite historian of all time,

in spite of modern critiques of his work and methodologies), another individual with exceptional insights, right or wrong. It is easy and obvious to cast Churchill as a hero.

But how can one possibly cast Hitler as a hero? No doubt many Germans saw him as a hero during his rise to power, and during his leadership of the country in the initial stages of the war before losses began to mount. Even decades after defeat, many still have appreciation for some of his accomplishments, such as the miraculous economic turn-around of the country, and his ability to put Germany once again among the top of the world powers. But I suspect that most Germans have a hard time classifying Hitler as a hero of the war in retrospect, having lost the war and ultimately having led Germany to a ruin deeper than the Versailles Treaty period. If anything, it was a German determination to rebuild, and an American environment, framework, and financing to do that, which might seem post-war heroic.

But in spite of the horrors he commanded, the self-centered and fatal egotism, the lies and deception, the arrogance and spiteful hatred of others, the paranoia, the murder and genocide, and the war that used Hitler as the detonator, I will make the lunatic case that if you stand on your head, cross your eyes, hold your breath for three minutes, and extrapolate wildly, Hitler was an ultimate and unrecognized hero for the Allies in a very profound way. His fatalistic attack on his puppet-master, Stalin, was the desperate, losing gamble that certainly spared Western Europe from Communism. The modern Western world owes him at least that, including our modern left-wing Western intellectuals.

Its hard not to laugh, to imagine that in some crazy sense, Churchill and Hitler were allies. ?But anecdotally, Churchill apparently stately in his last years, that "... perhaps we got the wrong guy ...". Patton knew that even in the heat of war. Roosevelt could never have suspected...

In any case, you must at least thank BOTH Churchill and Hitler for saving your ass from Communism.

Russia_and_China_Bulwarks_of_Resistance

Following Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of Russia, and the Japanese sweep of South-East Asia,

endsection

SEPARATE VIDEOS.....

Fire and brimstone - Forging the 20th century's dominant leader

Stalin's bio

10Dec2013 I'll have to work on this a bit later - writer burn-out

Don't believe a word I say - multiple conflicting hypothesis

10Dec2013 I'll do this much later - AFTER the main part of the film has been drafted.

Genesis_and_pursuit_of_a_hunch

Inadequate_research_and_detail

Conspiracy_theory_disease

Its easy to become immersed in conspiracy theories, which seem mostly to serve as excuses for our own failures. For that reason I normally do not like to delve into them at all. But its a bit hard to imagine a “true” description of a war without conspiracy theory of some sort, as wars by nature must involve conspiracies. And keep in mind that the conventional explanations for the rise of Hitler and the

Nazis, and the origins and motivations of the Second World War ARE conspiracy theories. In my view, this is not well enough recognized. "Multiple conflicting hypothesis" is my way of retaining a number of concepts, trying to avoid becoming a prisoner of concepts, instead of concepts simply being tools to use at my discretion.

How_outlandish_an_idea_is_this

Standing back from Hitler and Nazism, in general is that theme so outlandish?
Eastern European satellite Communist leaders, Mao Tse-Tun
... '

Central_theme_of_this_film_cannot_be_true_but_nor_can_convention_be

Multiple_conflicting_hypothesis_always_includes_convention

Its_the_questions_not_the_answers

Missing_pieces_to_the_story

Open_source_film_production

The_main_driver_of_social_change_is_affordability

Industrialization produced the greatest leap in human wealth and living standards of the entire existence of the human species. How is it that our images of this transitions seem to be dominated by misrepresentative images like Charles Diskson's England?

We_train_our_enemies

In the century following Marx, royalty, the military, mercantilists, socialists, and anybody else who sought

endsection

It's not the answers that count - it's the questions : Further themes

The_race_for_an_atomic_bomb

The_Roots_of_AntiSemitism

Hitler's anti-Semitism became an all-too convenient excuse for the same attitudes through Western civilisation and the Middle East, including widespread attitudes in modern times. Many occupied Pogroms against Jews were also carried out regularly in history, as with the reactions to the Bubonic Plague in the fourteenth century. Both the Nazis and the Muslims seems to be taking the blame for most of it today, again providing a convenient camouflage for others.

Stalin's_play_for_Japan

Eugenics_and_genocides_as_natural_tools_of_Communism

Communist revolution, Ukranian Holomodor, Polish Katyn, Jewish Holocaust (German and Russian), Chinese against themselves

Nuclear_bombs_in_the_right_hands

Destroyed progress in Germany and Japan, stolen in the nick of time, Einstein surprised

Hitlers_long_range_heavy_bomber

Navy and convoys.

Russia

Japans_sun_rose_too_early_for_Stalin

Of all the chessboard, the Japanese piece delayed critical action at Pearl Harbour until it was maximally useful to the Communists, more so than the Nazis.

Zhukarovs victory over Japan, was there a clear shipping passage across the Russian Arctic Ocean?

The_main_driver_of_social_change_is_affordability

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We_train_our_enemies

In the century following Marx, royalty, the military, mercantilists, socialists, and anybody else who sought

Hitler_was_the_same_as_Napolean

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Note that for pagination, I adopted the approach of identifying pages by providing the Chapter first, followed by the page in the chapter, eg "p1.02". These page numbers resulted from printing the book in landscape mode - and will NOT correspond to published page numbers.

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endRefs

Old junk wording

China_not_Mongolia

While the Nazis quickly dominated continental Western Europe during the first year of the war, on the other side of the world, but of less immediate concern to Europeans and Americans, the Japanese steam-rolled through China with equal speed and superiority. Their Southward thrust had been dictated by their stinging defeat at the Manchuria-Mongolia border at the hands of the famed Russian General Zhukov, in July 1939, more than a month prior to the onset of the European war. This led to a lop-sided Russian-Japanese pact, giving the Soviets some degree of protection in the East, just as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact protected them in the West. It is strange that Western intellectuals only speak of the the value of the Molotov-Ribentrop agreement to avoid war on two fronts from a German perspective. They rarely speak of the full Soviet perspective. The Soviets also faced a multi-front war, and not just a two front war as did the Germans. The logistics and time requirements for moving [men, equipment, resources] across the Soviet Union were vastly greater than for the Germans. Both pacts had historical enemies sleeping in the same uncomfortable beds, none of them as naive and foolish as many leaders in the West.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the Japanese faced similar hurdles to their progress and security as the Nazis, although these would only become in earnest after Pearl Harbour and the declaration of war. But as they knew war would come,

The "Battle of Britain" equivalent for Japan The Japanese version of the "Battle of the Atlantic"

was the threat posed by British and American naval power, anchored notably in Hong Kong, Singapore, the Phillipines, Port Moresby, Australia, Midway, Pearl Harbour, and throughout Polynesia. However, at this stage of the war, it is the isolation and conquest of China that was the immediate Japanese imperative.

This isolation of China was more easily achieved by Japanese naval power not yet at war with the Americans and British, than in the case of the Nazis who faced the full force of superior American and British naval power.

America, the Persian Gulf, Malaysia, Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia were Japan's main sources of oil, but the South-East Asian sources were their only real chance of securing oil sources. Their capture would also require the destruction of British, Dutch, French, and American bases in the region, giving the Japanese control over the Eastern Pacific and Indian Ocean, with a clear route to the oil, coal, iron ore, and aluminum of Australia.

Oil obviously posed a risk to Japanese military-economic expansion and security, so it was crucial for them to gain total direct control over petroleum fields. The oilfields of Mongolia were in close proximity to Japan and Japanese-controlled Manchuria, but having been firmly and finally denied access to those sources by the Russians, the imperative of securing oil supplies in South-East Asia became paramount. Access to other strategic materials such as iron and aluminum, was also important. China did not have the needed oil supplies, but it did have huge people and material resources. Furthermore, an independent China was a potential threat to the Japanese.

Strangely, the Japanese found themselves fighting some German-equipped Chinese soldiers. And the Chinese Nationalist government found it difficult to fight the Japanese and the Chinese communists at the same time. The Communists claimed to be patriotically fighting the Japanese, but their actions said something VERY different. Already the Russian-Chinese bed-fellows, smiling on the outside, were exchanging furious kicks under the sheets.

In any event, at the end of the first year of WWII, the Japanese were still pre-occupied with gaining control over China, and were not yet ready to take on the British and American fleets.

Pause for a moment, and think about the Westward thrust of the Nazis, and the Southward thrust of the Japanese. Who benefited the most from this scenario? Was it really in the best long-term strategic interests of the Japanese and Germans? Was it in the direction of Hitler's "Lebensbrau", established as a core Nazi doctrine decades before? How comfortable were the Japanese to have a major power right at their doorstep, a power whose navy was famously defeated by the Japanese in 1905, but who had just clobbered them on the battlefield? Why were the Germans and Japanese at odds in China? Did that go to the advantage of either?

The_right_stuff_for_the_Communist

Taking the Mao Zedong example, and that of several other Eastern Bloc leaders, from Stalin's perspective, if Hitler was missing anything, it was a lack of natural viciousness and betrayal. I am saying this in spite of the mainstream consensus about his nature and the directed actions of the Nazi groups such as the SS Gestapo. I don't seem to remember ever reading that he particularly enjoyed torturing and groups [individuals groups, towns, entire regions] before the start of WWII. He was wrongly blamed for decades for the murder of the Katyn murder of ~15,000 Polish officers following the invasion of Poland, which does indicate yet another fatal flaw in Western consensus thinking. But that event, among many others, does point out the main issue facing the Nazis - they had always had to survive in an environment driven by their socialist cousins, most notably the far more vicious and murderous German and Soviet Bolsheviks. Moralistic and purist approaches such as Gandhi's work with a far more accommodating master such as 19th century Britain, but are hollow and misleading in the context of hard socialists and the normal historical conquerers.

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